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That said, further reductions in numbers seem possible without compromising national security, and a follow-on treaty should facilitate them. Indeed, an analysis by the U. Intercontinental ground-launched boost-glide missiles and nuclear-powered torpedoes.

IGLBGMs are launched by large rockets, but rather than arcing high above the Earth like ICBMs, they reenter the atmosphere quickly and then glide unpowered through it at hypersonic speeds. Concerns about U. For now, the issue is moot because Poseidon will likely not be deployed within the lifetime of New START or even during a possible extension. Thus, the treaty should impose the following three categories of limits:.

Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. Although not a new technology, MIRVs—multiple independently targetable warheads—undermine crisis stability.

In particular, to meet the central limits of a treaty that mandated steeper reductions of warheads than of deployed delivery systems and launchers, Russia would probably need to reduce the warhead loadings on some MIRVed ICBMs. While this approach would not require Russia to abandon such weapons entirely, it might lead Moscow to reassess the utility of Sarmat—a new heavily MIRVed ICBM currently under development—and deploy it in smaller numbers or, perhaps, not at all and instead place a greater emphasis on more survivable mobile ICBMs in particular, the mobile variant of the RS ICBM, which is currently under production.

These capabilities all have or could have strategic ranges but have never been limited through an arms control agreement. Prohibitions or restrictions on deployments could be helpful in managing the risks associated with them.

Nuclear-powered cruise missiles. Russia is trying to develop a nuclear-powered cruise missile, Burevestnik, though its efforts appear to have encountered significant setbacks. Most significantly, an accident in August that killed five Russian scientists and released radiation was reportedly the result of a botched operation to recover a missile that had crashed during a test.

By contrast, these weapons create significant costs and dangers, including the expense and difficulty of development and the considerable environmental risks of testing. As a result, such missiles should be prohibited. This measure would help Russia assure its European neighbors that they will be not be negatively affected by further testing.

The follow-on treaty should prohibit each party from researching, producing, flight testing, or deploying nuclear-powered cruise missiles. Air-launched ballistic and boost-glide missiles. B-1B and BH heavy bombers—would be problematic. There is some concern in the United States that a modernized version of the aircraft, the TuM3M, may exceed the range threshold—though Russia has stated otherwise.

Arming these aircraft with nonnuclear ALBMs or ALBGMs could exacerbate Russian fears about conventional attacks on its nuclear forces, thus risking crisis instability during a conflict.

The simplest way to address these concerns would be for Russia and the United States to agree, under a follow-on treaty, to deploy nuclear or nonnuclear long-range ALBMs or ALBGMs only on treaty-accountable heavy bombers or on nonaccountable tactical fighters. In the meantime, it would be helpful for them to adopt this rule on a politically binding basis. The follow-on treaty should prohibit the deployment of long-range ALBMs and long-range ALBGMs except on either 1 treaty-accountable heavy bombers or 2 nonaccountable short-range tactical aircraft.

Sea-launched boost-glide missiles. However, nonnuclear SLBGMs would almost certainly be deployed on nuclear-powered attack submarines or surface ships, which would likely preclude their limitation in a new treaty. These platforms have never been subject to inspections, and verifying limits on missiles deployed on them would be impractical.

There is no publicly available evidence that either Russia or the United States is developing such weapons. However, because these missiles might be more effective than SLBMs at penetrating defenses, one or both parties may seek them to augment—or perhaps even replace—their SLBM forces.

In an agreed statement, included as an annex to the follow-on treaty, Russia and the United States should agree that long-range nuclear-armed SLBGMs, if deployed, will constitute a new kind of strategic offensive arm. The United States has used these provisions to meet those limits. Russia, however, has argued that the procedures the United States used to convert SLBM launchers and BH bombers are not irreversible and that Russian acceptance of those procedures is required before converted systems become nonaccountable.

To this end, two principles should be adopted. First, where possible, conversions should use procedures and practices that both parties have previously accepted. Second, additional transparency measures should be implemented to build confidence in the effectiveness of conversion procedures. SLBM launcher conversions.

Russia also argues that this closure prevents inspectors from verifying that the tube is incapable of containing or launching an SLBM. The United States removed components to disable the launchers but has been unwilling to allow Russian inspectors to verify their absence. While the United States acted in good faith in selecting the conversion method, were the situation reversed, Washington would probably be raising the same objections that Moscow is.

This controversy could likely have been avoided if the United States had adopted the same approach it took when it converted all the SLBM launchers on four Ohio-class SSBNs into cruise missile launchers. The United States reduced both the length and diameter of those tubes—a procedure that Russia acknowledged left the tubes verifiably incapable of launching SLBMs.

This procedure, along with enhanced transparency, should become the standard for SLBM launcher conversions under a follow-on treaty. The follow-on treaty should permit SLBM launcher conversions provided that 1 the length or diameter of the launch tube is reduced to render it physically incapable of accommodating an SLBM, and 2 following conversion, inspectors are able to view the interior of the launch tube from topside to confirm any reductions.

Heavy bomber conversions and exemptions. In converting BH bombers, the United States severed their nuclear arming circuits and removed their nuclear pre-arming switches. However, the United States is unwilling to remove the attachment points for nuclear weapons because this equipment is also used for nonnuclear munitions.

Russia has stated that it cannot verify that these converted aircraft are incapable of launching long-range nuclear-armed ALCMs. Instead, it argues that converted bombers should be based at air bases with no nuclear infrastructure. Moscow and Washington may want some of these aircraft to be configured exclusively for conventional operations and hence exempted from accountability. However, it could be challenging to credibly distinguish between bombers of these types that are configured for nuclear operations and those that are not.

An approach to managing this set of issues should be built around three principles. There is clear precedent for this approach. During New START negotiations, for example, Russia accepted that converted B-1Bs were nonnuclear—and hence nonaccountable—in part because they are based separately from treaty-accountable heavy bombers.

Finally, a follow-on treaty should provide more transparency on the operations of certain nonaccountable bombers—converted heavy bombers as well as nonnuclear PAK-DA and B aircraft—to build confidence that they are not available for nuclear operations and that the two countries are not practicing or preparing for conventional counterforce strikes.

Converted bombers should not be treaty-accountable, and it should be permissible to base them at either nuclear or nonnuclear air bases. Provided that these aircraft continue to be based exclusively at nonnuclear air bases, they should not be considered to be treaty-accountable heavy bombers and should not be subject to the enhanced transparency requirements for converted and new nonnuclear heavy bombers, as described below.

The parties should be required to designate all new heavy bombers—that is, heavy bombers of a type not deployed when New START entered into force—as either nonnuclear or nuclear-capable prior to their first deployment.

A party may change the designation of a new heavy bomber from nonnuclear to nuclear-capable, provided that the party rebases the aircraft to a nuclear air base at which point it becomes treaty-accountable. A party may not change the designation of a new heavy bomber from nuclear-capable to nonnuclear. All new nonnuclear heavy bombers and all heavy bombers converted under either New START or the follow-on treaty should be subject to enhanced transparency requirements.

Specifically, each party should be required to assign all such bombers a unique identifier and provide specified notifications about their operations—in particular, their movements outside national territory and their participation in major exercises.

Its effectiveness, however, is limited. The result would almost certainly be an irresolvable disagreement. In the interim, the party developing the weapon would not be restricted from deploying it. Since the New START negotiations, the United States has become concerned that Russia is developing various new kinds of strategic offensive arms that may not be accountable under the treaty. Meanwhile, Russia has long been concerned about strategic conventional weapons or conventionally armed weapons with strategic range and has sought to engage the United States in discussions about subjecting them to arms control.

As a result, both states should now have an interest in a follow-on agreement with a stronger provision that automatically requires new kinds of strategic offensive arms to be accountable—with the scope of any negotiations restricted to implementation arrangements only. If history is any guide, the negotiations over such a provision would play out in a predictable way. A compromise is possible. The new kinds provision in a follow-on treaty should apply to both nuclear and nonnuclear weapons of strategic range.

Its scope, however, should be limited only to kinds of arms that emerged after negotiations and not to existing kinds that are nonaccountable because the two sides disagreed on whether they should be otherwise a party could weaponize this provision and use it to accomplish during implementation what it failed to achieve during negotiations.

In an agreed statement, Russia and the United States should provide nonexhaustive lists of arms that they would and would not consider to be new kinds of strategic offensive arms.

In the agreed statement, the parties should commit to declaring, at the time of entry into force, 1 all systems currently under development that may be deployed during the lifetime of the treaty that may constitute a new kind for purposes of the treaty, and 2 the anticipated year of deployment for each such system.

Each party should update its declaration annually. All required modifications would be relatively minor and should be straightforward to design and implement—though two are significant enough to highlight here. In fact, inspections of NTs could be somewhat simpler because it should be acceptable to assume that each NT has only one warhead, whereas the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on an SLBM must be verified.

A cooperative solution to this problem would be challenging because of the difficulties associated with inspecting nonnuclear SLBGMs deployed on nuclear-powered attack submarines or surface ships to verify that they are indeed nonnuclear. That said, in implementing previous arms control agreements, Russia and the United States have been content to rely on NTM for determining whether an ALCM is nuclear-armed—a similar kind of challenge.

NTM would also be used to determine the range of boost-glide missiles which is necessary because such missiles would be accountable only if they have a range of kilometers when air- or sea-launched, or 5, kilometers when ground-launched. Essentially identical techniques can be used to determine the characteristics of the rocket booster used to a launch a hypersonic glider.

The glider itself can likely be tracked for almost its entire trajectory with existing early-warning satellites, thus enabling its characteristics most importantly, the ratio between the lift and drag forces it experiences and its maximum speed to be ascertained. From a technical perspective, the proposed treaty appears to be entirely feasible. While it would unquestionably be a long and complex agreement—requiring perhaps a year of negotiations at a minimum—it would be based on New START, which has been successfully implemented.

The political prospects of a follow-on agreement, however, are significantly less bright than the technical ones—though they are not entirely bleak. A Republican president would likely have little difficulty securing the two-thirds majority needed to obtain the U. A Democratic president would face a much tougher challenge given likely Republican opposition, but recent congressional support for the extension of New START suggests that there is some continuing bipartisan backing for arms control.

A well-managed ratification campaign could tap into this support, though such a campaign would undoubtedly be difficult. But perhaps the single biggest challenge facing a follow-on treaty is simply the perilous state of U. Under the current circumstances, when the default assumption for each state is that the other is acting in bad faith, and they have to tackle emerging technologies that have never been regulated, negotiations would likely be particularly fraught.

The state of the bilateral relationship also makes it more difficult for each party to accept the compromises that would inevitably be required to conclude a treaty. Russia, meanwhile, would not succeed in restricting ballistic missile defenses.

The result could be considerable pressure to expand the scope of negotiations. Yielding to this pressure would be a mistake, however. Precisely because relations between Russia and the United States are so poor, there is little prospect of their reaching a comprehensive agreement that includes capabilities as sensitive as nonstrategic nuclear warheads and ballistic missile defenses.

Similarly, for Russia, the choice is not between a bilateral treaty that limits strategic offensive and defensive forces and one that limits only offensive forces, but between limits on offensive forces and no limits at all. Given this reality, both governments should focus on negotiating a new bilateral strategic offensive arms limitation treaty. Of course, this approach would not preclude separate negotiations to address other security concerns.

On the contrary, the successful conclusion and implementation of a follow-on treaty would help create a better environment for them. But these agreements did help curb the worst excesses of the arms race and, perhaps more importantly, paved the way for later and more ambitious agreements. A similar spirit of pragmatism would serve Russia and the United States well today. For their invariably excellent editing, design, and production work, we thank Lori Merritt and Amy Mellon.

Thomas Bussiere, Deputy Commander of the U. Strategic Command Gen. John Hyten in U. Strategic Offensive Arms Published by the U. One possibility is that it will contain six launchers but eight torpedoes, thus allowing for two reloads. If so, based on the definitions in this section, it would count as six NT launchers, eight NTs, and eight strategic deployed warheads. Acton, ed. Though substantive obligations cannot be changed absent a treaty amendment, minor matters relating to implementation, including inspection procedures, may be altered through agreement of the parties in the Bilateral Consultative Commission without the need to amend the treaty.

While the treaty counts each ICBM and SLBM reentry vehicle as a single warhead, counting rules for warheads attributed to heavy bombers are more complicated. Each Russian heavy bomber equipped to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs defined as having maximum range of km or more , up to a total of bombers, counts as eight warheads toward the 6, warhead limit, even though existing Russian heavy bomber types can carry between six and 16 ALCMs.

Each Russian heavy bomber above the level of has its actual number of ALCMs counted toward the 6, warhead limit. Similarly, each U. Bombers not equipped to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs are counted as one warhead. Data exchange: Accompanying the START I treaty is a Memorandum of Understanding drafted by the two parties, which contains an extensive set of data, including numbers and locations of all strategic delivery vehicles, both deployed and non-deployed, as well the locations and diagrams of all facilities associated with strategic delivery vehicles, such as bases, storage and production facilities, etc.

Each party is required to provide notification about any change in that data shortly after it occurs. In addition, parties must exchange the entire set of data contained in the Memorandum every six months;.

On-site inspections to verify the accuracy of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. Some of those inspections are short-notice baseline data, data update, reentry vehicle, etc.

The treaty also provides for a special verification regime for mobile ICBMs. During the first seven years the period of reductions , the United States conducted inspections; Russia conducted Perimeter and portal monitoring of plants that produce mobile ICBMs. Because the United States decided not to deploy such missiles, this measure only applies to Russia: the United States established monitoring at the Votkinsk plant or, rather, continued, because its monitoring began under the INF Treaty ;.

A ban on encryption of telemetry transmitted from ballistic missiles during test launches and exchange of all such telemetry. On 8 April in Prague, U. Data exchanges occur no later than 30 days after the expiration of each six-month period following entry into force of the Treaty.

Negotiations were put on hold during the American and Russian holidays. As the treaty expired, U. Russia was unable to maintain reciprocal monitoring at an American production facility after the United States halted the production of Peacekeeper missiles in Promontory, Utah in April On 29 May, Russia announced that it had dismantled 36 outdated Topol mobile ballistic missile systems in and twelve in two consecutive operations in March and May under the provisions of the START I treaty.

On 11 September, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated Russia was still awaiting concrete proposals from the United States, a statement confirming Russian sources contending that the U.

In March, the United States and Russia commenced bilateral consultations at the level of the deputy minister to explore a post-START agreement, including a possible extension of certain verification elements of the treaty. In July, statements were made at an informal meeting between U. President George W. In response, the Pentagon claimed that the second and third stages of the Peacekeeper are used for space launch vehicles, which are permitted under START I. On 13 November President Putin announced that in late October the last Ukrainian nuclear warhead had been destroyed in Russia.

In particular, Russia announced that it had reduced its deployed strategic delivery vehicles to and its accountable warheads to This accomplishment marked the largest arms control reduction in history. Under the revision, Russia can establish space-launch sites anywhere in the world as long as the converted ICBM launchers remain under Russian control. The teams inspected 71 weapons facilities in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. On 23 April, President Clinton announced an accelerated reduction schedule for U.

However, Russia announced that it would not exchange its instrument of ratification until Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. Explore the Center. Close This treaty has expired.

Category Nuclear Subcategory Bilateral. Ratified See Status. Want to dive deeper? Entered into Force 5 December Duration 15 year duration with option to extend for unlimited five year periods, if all parties agree.

Expired 5 December These include: 1.